### 1NC

#### **A. Uniquness -- US is developing an Iran Latin America strategy now, but it’s in its infancy – broad foreign policy outcomes necessary to check a growing Iran.**

Berman 6-5

(Ilan, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council, “Iran on our back porch: Column”, USAToday, 2013, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/06/05/argentina-iran-terrorism-column/2389271/>, DZ)

America, meanwhile, is still struggling to craft a coherent response to Iran's regional ambitions. Policymakers in Washington were jolted awake to Iran's activities south of the border in October of 2011, when law enforcement agencies foiled a plot orchestrated by a faction of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps operating in South America to assassinate Adel Al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, in a Washington, D.C. restaurant.¶ In response, legislation authored last year by enterprising freshman Rep. Jeff Duncan, R-S.C., mandated that the State Department develop a strategy to "counter Iran in the Western Hemisphere." The bill sailed through Congress and was signed into law by President Obama back in December. But whether that strategy, when it does materialize this summer, will be broad enough to address the extent of Iran's presence in the Western Hemisphere is still very much an open question.¶ It will need to be. As Nisman's investigation and resulting indictment indicates, the Iranian regime's activities in Latin America are extensive -- and evolving. So is the threat that it poses, both to our allies in the region and to the U.S. homeland itself.

#### B. Link -- The plan collapses this – it reduces the strategy to a realm of trade – this checks a comprehensive approach essential to check growing Iranian influence.

Farah 2012

(Douglas, International Assessment and Strategy Center’s (IASC) Senior Fellow, Financial Investigations and Transparency. US Army War College, “Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority”, August, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117>, DZ)

Latin America, while not generally viewed as part of the stateless regions phenomenon, or part of the failed state discussion, presents multiple threats that center on criminalized states, their hybrid alliance with extra-regional sponsors of terrorism, and nonstate TOC actors. The groups within this hybrid threat—often rivals, but willing to work in temporary alliances—are part of the recombinant criminal/terrorist pipeline, and their violence is often aimed at gaining control of specific territory or parts of that pipeline, either from state forces or other nonstate groups.¶ In areas outside effective government control, the state is either absent or ineffective, contributing to the governance problem through corruption and negligence. Only Colombia has made significant progress in recouping internal space for the government, and that progress is fragile and in danger of being reversed.126 While the basic model of the pipeline holds up well, the emerging situation can be likened to new branches of the pipeline being built in regions where it previously had no access.¶ The combination of ungoverned spaces, criminalized states, and TOC groups poses a growing, dangerous, and immediate threat to the security of the United States. The traffic in drugs, weapons, and humans from Latin American northward relies on the same ba64¶ sic pipeline structures to move. The same recombinant chains also move bulk cash, stolen cars, and weapons from the United States southward. This demonstrates that these groups can successfully cross our border, and do, multiple times each day, in both directions. The pipelines are seldom disrupted for more than a minimal amount of time, in part because the critical human nodes in the chain, and key chokepoints in the pipelines, are not identified, and the relationships among the different actors and groups are not understood adequately. As noted, pipelines are adaptable and versatile as to product—the epitome of modern management systems—often intersecting with formal commercial institutions (banks, commodity exchanges, legitimate companies, etc.), both in a physical and virtual/cyber manner, in ways difficult to determine, collect intelligence on, or disaggregate from protected commercial activities which may be both domestic and international in nature, with built-in legal and secrecy protections.¶ While the situation is already critical, it is likely to get worse quickly. There is growing evidence of Russian and Chinese organized crime penetration of the region, particularly in Mexico and Central America, greatly strengthening the criminal organizations and allowing them to diversify their portfolios and supply routes—a particular example being precursor chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamines and cocaine. The Chinese efforts to acquire ports, resources, and intelligence-gathering capacity in the region demonstrate just how quickly the situation can develop, given that China was not a major player in the region 5 years ago. Iranian, Russian, and Chinese banks operating in the region all offer new ways to move money into unregulated channels that benefit¶ 65¶ both terrorist and criminal organizations, along with corrupt officials.¶ At the same time, there is strong evidence that states of the Bolivarian Axis, led by Venezuela and including Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, not only tolerate increased criminal activities in their territories, but also sponsor nonstate armed groups designated as terrorist entities by the United States, including the FARC in Colombia, and Hezbollah. These states appear to allow their stateless areas to be franchised out to these groups in order for the nonstate actors to both fund their activities and spread unrest throughout the region.¶ Of particular concern is the relationship of these Bolivarian states, which support nonstate actors in the hemisphere, with Iran, a state that has for many years funded, trained, and protected Hezbollah, one of the most effective and efficient nonstate (or quasi-state) terrorist actors in the world. The growing presence of Hezbollah in the Latin American drug trade—both directly and through its proxies in West Africa and Southern Eurasia—presents a new and important threat to U.S. security.¶ The only thing the Bolivarian nations proclaiming “21st-century socialism” and the reactionary theocratic regime in Iran, have in common is a stated hatred for the United States and the desire to inflict damage on the nation they view as the “Evil Empire” or the “Great Satan.” This is a new type of alliance of secular (self-proclaimed socialist and Marxist) and radical Islamist organizations with a common goal directly aimed at challenging and undermining the security of the United States and its primary allies in the region (Colombia, Chile, Peru, Panama, and Guatemala). This represents a fundamental change because both¶ 66¶ primary state allies in the alliance (the governments of Venezuela and Iran) host and support nonstate actors, allowing the nonstate actors to thrive in ways that would be impossible without state protection.¶ Given this reality, it is imperative that U.S. intelligence community, military, and law enforcement agencies develop a much deeper and more nuanced understanding of how the criminalized state/TOC/terrorist groups and foreign hostile state and nonstate foreign actors exploit the ungoverned or stateless spaces in areas of close proximity to U.S. borders—and the dangers they represent both in their current configuration, and their future iterations. Understanding how these groups develop, and how they relate to each other and to groups from outside the region, is vital—particularly given the rapid pace with which they are expanding their control across the continent, across the hemisphere, and beyond. Developing a predictive capacity can be done based only on a more realistic understanding of the shifting networks of actors exploiting the pipelines; the nature and location of the geographic space in which they operate; the critical nodes where these groups are most vulnerable; and their behaviors in adapting to new political and economic developments, market opportunities and setbacks, internal competition, and the countering actions of governments.¶ In turn, an effective strategy for combating TOC must rest on a solid foundation of regional intelligence which, while cognizant of the overarching transnational connections, remains sensitive to unique local realities behind seemingly ubiquitous behaviors. A one-size-fits-all policy will not suffice. It is not a problem that is only, or primarily, a matter of state or regional security, narcotics, money laundering, ter67¶ rorism, human smuggling, weakening governance, democracy reversal, trade and energy, counterfeiting and contraband, immigration and refugees, hostile states seeking advantage, or alterations in the military balance and alliances. It is increasingly a combination of all of these. It is a comprehensive threat that requires analysis and management within a comprehensive, integrated whole-of-government approach. At the same time, however expansive in global terms, a strategy based on geopolitics—the fundamental understanding of how human behavior relates to geographic space—must always be rooted in the local.

#### C Internal link and impact

#### 1. A hardline component is necessary to deter US-Iranian war.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan, “Confronting Iran’s Latin American Ambitions”, Forbes, 12-4, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilanberman/2012/12/04/confronting-irans-latin-american-ambitions/>, DZ)

To the contrary, America’s strategic profile in Latin America is now poised to constrict precipitously. As a result of looming defense cuts, and with the specter of additional, and ruinous, “sequester” provisions on the horizon, the Pentagon is now actively planning a more modest global profile. To that end, back in May, General Douglas Fraser, the outgoing head of U.S. Southern Command, the combatant command responsible for the Americas, told lawmakers that it plans to retract to Central America and focus predominantly on the threats posed by the region’s rampant drug and arms trades. In other words, the United States is getting out of the business of competing for strategic influence in Latin America, and doing so at precisely the time that Iran is getting serious about it.¶ That could end up being a costly mistake. As the findings of the Homeland Security Committee’s study indicate, Iran’s presence south of the U.S. border represents more than a mere annoyance. It is, rather, a potential front for Iranian action against the United States—one that could well be activated if and when the current cold war between Iran and the West over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program heats up in earnest. Washington needs to be prepared should that happen.¶ Better yet, it needs to craft a proactive approach to confronting Iran influence and activity south of our border. That, after all, is the surest way for us to avoid having to face Iran and its proxies here at home.

#### 2. A single spark triggers nuclear war – perceptions of US weakness make Middle East explosion inevitable.

Herbert I. **London 10**, President Emeritus of Hudson Institute, “The Coming Crisis in the Middle East”, June 23, <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=7101&pubType=HI_Opeds>

The gathering storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum. War clouds are on the horizon and like conditions prior to World War I all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey’s provocative flotilla - often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission - has set in motion a flurry of diplomatic activity, but if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, it could present a casus belli. It is also instructive that Syria is playing a dangerous game with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long, medium and short range missiles and Syrian territory has served as a conduit for military material from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. Iran is poised to be the hegemon in the Middle East. It is increasingly considered the “strong horse” as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia regional strategic vision is a combination of deal making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counter weight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state. Should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni “tent” must stand on two legs, if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should that tent collapse and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling its oats and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario with nuclear weapons in tow, war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However, implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange. The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an active United States’ policy. Yet curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from the region. Despite rhetoric which suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, it has done nothing to forestall that eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. And despite historic links to Israel that gave the U.S. leverage in the region and a democratic ally, the Obama administration treats Israel as a national security albatross that must be disposed of as soon as possible. As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the region as the “weak horse,” the one that is dangerous to ride. In every Middle East capital the words “unreliable and United States” are linked. Those seeking a moderate course of action are now in a distinct minority. A political vacuum is emerging, one that is not sustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with imperial exhilaration. It is no longer a question of whether war will occur, but rather when it will occur and where it will break out. There are many triggers to ignite the explosion, but not many scenarios for containment. Could it be a regional war in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia watch from the sidelines, but secretly wish for Israeli victory? Or is this a war in which there aren’t victors, only devastation? Moreover, should war break out, what does the U.S. do? This is a description far more dire than any in the last century and, even if some believe my view is overly pessimistic, Arab and Jew, Persian and Egyptian, Muslim and Maronite tend to believe in its veracity. That is a truly bad sign.

## Overview and Uniqueness

### 2NC overview

#### A Latin American Iran strategy is being developed now and will likely be broad – the plan collapses this momentum by setting into precedent free market interactions with key Iran supporters in the region. This ushers in unprecedented Iranian influence and makes global conflagration inevitable – disad outweighs and turns the case:

#### A – Timeframe – rise is occurring now – strategy developed now is key.

#### B – Magnitude – major powers are already intertwined – that was Farah – a US-Iranian incident doesn’t stay contained to Latin America but spreads to the Middle East – that’s a powder keg which ensures escalation.

#### Destabilizes Latin America – zero feasibility for an aff advantage.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council “Iran Courts Latin America”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3297.pdf>, DZ)

Conventional wisdom in Washington has¶ long held that Tehran’s activism in the America¶ is opportunistic—rather than operational. Yet¶ Iran’s growing asymmetric capabilities through-¶ out the region have the potential to be directed¶ against the U.S. homeland. This was hammered¶ home by the foiled October 2011 plot, an attack¶ which—had it been successful—would poten-¶ tially have killed scores of U.S. citizens in the¶ nation’s capital in the most significant terrorist¶ event since 9/11.¶ The incident represents a seismic shift in¶ Tehran’s strategic calculations. As Director of¶ National Intelligence James Clapper observed¶ in his January 2012 testimony before the Senate¶ Select Committee on Intelligence, in response to¶ mounting international pressure and asymmet-¶ ric activity against Tehran’s nuclear program, it¶ appears that “Iranian officials—probably includ-¶ ing Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i—have¶ changed their calculus and are now willing to¶ conduct an attack in the United States.”¶ 29¶ Latin America figures prominently in this¶ equation. The foiled October 2011 plot suggests¶ that Tehran increasingly deems the region an¶ advantageous operational theater. More-¶ over, as its influence and activities there in-¶ tensify, the Iranian regime will be able to field¶ a progressively more robust operational¶ presence in the Americas. Clapper concluded¶ his Senate testimony with an ominous warn-¶ ing: “The Iranian regime has formed alliances¶ with Chavez, Ortega, Castro, and Correa that¶ many believe can destabilize the hemisphere,” he noted. “These alliances can pose¶ an immediate threat by giving Iran—directly¶ through the IRGC, the Qods force, or its prox-¶ ies like Hezbollah—a platform in the region¶ to carry out attacks against the United¶ States, our interests, and allies.”¶ 30

#### Absent escalation – the impact collapses US influence in the region – takes out the aff.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council “Iran Courts Latin America”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3297.pdf>, DZ)

It would be a mistake, however, to view these¶ contacts as simply pragmatic—or strictly defen-¶ sive. The Iranian regime’s sustained systematic¶ outreach to regional states suggests that it sees¶ the Western Hemisphere as a crucial strategic¶ theater for expanding its own influence and reducing that of the United States. Indeed, a 2009¶ dossier prepared by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign¶ Affairs noted that “since Ahmadinejad’s rise to¶ power, Tehran has been promoting an aggres-¶ sive policy aimed at bolstering its ties with Latin¶ American countries with the declared goal of¶ ‘bringing America to its knees.’”¶ 8¶ This view is¶ increasingly shared by the U.S. military: In its¶ 2010 report on Iranian military power, the Office¶ of the Secretary of Defense noted that “Iran¶ seeks to increase its stature by countering U.S.¶ influence and expanding ties with regional ac-¶ tors” in Latin America.¶ 9¶ To this end, Tehran is ramping up its stra-¶ tegic messaging to the region. In late January,¶ on the heels of Ahmadinejad’s very public four-¶ country tour of Latin America, the Iranian re-¶ gime formally launched HispanTV, a Spanish-¶ language analogue to its English-language¶ Press¶ TV channel.¶ 10¶ The television outlet has¶ been depicted by Ahmadinejad as part of his¶ government’s efforts to “limit the ground for¶ supremacy of dominance seekers”—a thinly-¶ veiled reference to U.S. influence in the West-¶ ern Hemisphere.¶ 11¶ As Ahmadinejad’s statement indicates,¶ Tehran is pursuing a strategy that promotes its¶ own ideology and influence in Latin America at¶ Washington’s expense. In this endeavor, it has¶ been greatly aided by Chavez, who himself has¶ worked diligently to diminish U.S. political and¶ economic presence in the region under the ban-¶ ner of a new “Bolivarian” revolution.

### 2NC – Uniqueness

#### Strong and militarized Iran in Latin America strategy ensured now – that was Berman.

#### Backed by the far right – it will be hardline – the hippies agree.

Main 1-5

(Alex, Common Dreams, “It’s Official: Iran’s Presence in the Region a Threat to US, According to Congress and Obama”, <http://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/01/05-4>, DZ)

While Congress struggled to approve legislation to avert the much-hyped “fiscal cliff”, a bill addressing “Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere” quietly and smoothly swept through both houses before the end of the legislative session. The bill, which requires the State Department to develop a strategy to address the Iranian regional “threat”, was signed into law by President Obama on December 28th.¶ If you haven’t heard of the “Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012” (H.R. 3783), that may be because you aren’t a faithful reader of the neoconservative Commentary Magazine, which urged President Obama to sign the bill; or of the web page of the Heritage Foundation. Nor did you receive the press release of the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) that applauded the bill’s passage and noted that it would help “turn back Iranian attempts to establish bases, subvert the economic relationships between the US and Latin America, and the establishment of covert abilities to promote terrorism in countries close to our own US borders.” The ZOA is an organization with links to Israel’s far right and counts among its members rightwing billionaires Sheldon Adelson and Irving Moskowitz, best known for their hardline pro-settlement and anti-Iran positions and their generous donations to Republican super Pacs during the 2012 presidential campaign.¶ Indeed, though the bill was approved nearly unanimously in both chambers, only far right organizations appear to have openly supported it.

#### The hardline stance will succeed – reveals military information for containment.

Rubin ‘12

(Michael, “President Should Sign “Counter Iran in the Western Hemisphere” Act, Commentary Magazine, 12-19, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/12/19/president-should-sign-counter-iran-in-the-western-hemisphere-act/>, DZ)

If the bill becomes a law—and presumably it will because the White House did not oppose it—then the secretary of state will have to report to Congress on a broad range of Iranian activity in the Western hemisphere. According to the Congressional Research Service’s summary, the report will include:¶ (1) Descriptions of the presence, activities, and operations of Iran, the IRGC, the IRGC’s Qods Force, and Hezbollah;¶ (2) descriptions of the terrain, population, ports, foreign firms, airports, borders, media outlets, financial centers, foreign embassies, charities, religious and cultural centers, and income-generating activities utilized by Iran, the IRGC, the IRGC’s Qods Force, and Hezbollah;¶ (3) descriptions of the relationship of Iran, the IRGC, the IRGC’s Qods Force, and Hezbollah with transnational criminal organizations;¶ (4) descriptions of the relationship of Iran, the IRGC, the IRGC’s Qods Force, and Hezbollah that may be present with governments in the Western Hemisphere;¶ (5) descriptions of federal law enforcement capabilities, military forces, state and local government institutions, and other critical elements, such as nongovernmental organizations that may organize to counter the Iranian threat in the Western Hemisphere; [and]¶ (6) descriptions of activity by Iran, the IRGC, the IRGC’s Qods Force, and Hezbollah that may be present at the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada and at other international borders within the Western Hemisphere¶ Under Secretary of State Clinton and her two Bush administration predecessors, the State Department’s attitude toward Iran in the Western hemisphere has been “hear no evil, see no evil, report no evil.” Yet, the Iranian government has pursued an active strategy in the region. My American Enterprise Institute colleague Roger Noreiga has written a great deal on the Iran-Venezuela nexus, including here at COMMENTARY. His analysis has been remarkably prescient; most critics counter not Roger’s evidence, but simply the fact that the State Department has yet to second his findings. The reason for that is, more often than not, because diplomats refuse to look. Let us hope that Obama signs the bill: Information should not an enemy for policymakers.

### AT: Engagement Solves the DA

#### Nothing short of systemic security analysis solves.

Walser ‘12

(Ray, “Iran: A Strategy for the Threat Closer to Home”, September 18, <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/09/18/iran-a-strategy-for-the-threat-closer-to-home/>, DZ)

The House of Representatives will soon take floor action on a piece of legislation know as the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, aimed at protecting American citizens from Iran and defending American interests and assets in the Western Hemisphere. Introduced last March, the legislation requires the Secretary of State to assess, report on, and develop a strategy for countering the presence of Iran and its allies such as Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere. Such a requirement is timely.¶ Debate and likely passage comes at an opportune moment: when the Obama Administration inclines to minimize threats closer to home posed by Iran, Hezbollah, and anti-Americans like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez.¶ Yet, the facts on the ground remain troublesome. Just this month, Brazilian journal Veja and others reported on a police seizure in La Paz, Bolivia, of two tons of minerals believed initially to contain uranium but more likely tantalum. The mineral is in demand for, among other things, nuclear reactors and missile parts. Export of this mineral to Iran is prohibited by current sanction regimes. It is believed that the plan was to send secretly the mineral cargo to Iran via Venezuela.¶ In Mexico, Rafic Mohammad Labbon Allaboun was arrested earlier this month and extradited to the U.S. He is believed to have engaged in money laundering for Hezbollah and was carrying false documents obtained in Belize. Also, reports of a Hezbollah training camp in remote northern Nicaragua have surfaced and invite investigation.¶ Critical U.S. security thinking is required to probe increasing linkages between anti-American states like Venezuela and Bolivia, transnational criminal organizations, foreign terrorist organizations, and state sponsors of terrorism like Iran. This troublesome combination, as Douglas Farah reports, is increasingly becoming a “tier 1” national security priority.¶ In short, acting systematically with a modest investment to counter Iran in the Western Hemisphere makes imminent security sense.

## Links

### 2NC Link Wall

#### 1NC isolates two links:

#### 1 – Divergence from a comprehensive strategy – that was Farah. Plan sets in momentum for a trade based strategy that ignores the growing relationship between Iran and Latin American disintegration.

#### 2 – Lack of a stick – the plan decimates our negotiating leverage by providing trade principles absent a requirement to cease disruptive or non-democratic internal policies.

#### Those sticks are key to check Iranian influence.

Obama ‘7

(Barack, “Renewing American Leadership”, Foreign Affairs, July/August, <http://www.attiaspace.com/Assignments/obama.pdf>, DZ)

Throughout the Middle East, we must harness American power to reinvigorate American diplomacy. Tough-minded¶ diplomacy, backed by the whole range of instruments of American power -- political, economic, and military -- could¶ bring success even when dealing with long-standing adversaries such as Iran and Syria. Our policy of issuing threats and¶ relying on intermediaries to curb Iran's nuclear program, sponsorship of terrorism, and regional aggression is failing.¶ Although we must not rule out using military force, we should not hesitate to talk directly to Iran. Our diplomacy should¶ aim to raise the cost for Iran of continuing its nuclear program by applying tougher sanctions and increasing pressure¶ from its key trading partners. The world must work to stop Iran's uranium-enrichment program and prevent Iran from¶ acquiring nuclear weapons. It is far too dangerous to have nuclear weapons in the hands of a radical theocracy. At the¶ same time, we must show Iran -- and especially the Iranian people -- what could be gained from fundamental change:¶ economic engagement, security assurances, and diplomatic relations. Diplomacy combined with pressure could also¶ reorient Syria away from its radical agenda to a more moderate stance -- which could, in turn, help stabilize Iraq, isolate¶ Iran, free Lebanon from Damascus' grip, and better secure Israel.

#### Asymmetric nature of Latin American growth ensures Iran profits economically from the plan.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council “Iran Courts Latin America”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3297.pdf>, DZ)

Tehran’s formal political and economic con-¶ tacts with regional states are reinforced by a¶ broad web of asymmetric activities throughout¶ the Americas. Illicit financial transactions figure¶ prominently in this regard. Over the past several¶ years, Tehran’s economic ties with Caracas have¶ helped it skirt the sanctions being levied by the¶ international community as well as to continue¶ to operate in an increasingly inhospitable glo-¶ bal financial system. It has done so through the¶ establishment of joint companies and financial¶ entities as well as the formation of wholly Ira-¶ nian-owned financial entities in Venezuela and¶ the entrenchment of Iranian commercial banks¶ there.¶ 23¶ Experts note that this financial activity¶ exploits an existing loophole¶ in the current sanctions regime¶ against Tehran—one that le-¶ verages the freedom of action¶ of Venezuelan banks to pro-¶ vide the Islamic Republic with¶ “an ancillary avenue through¶ which it can access the inter-national financial system despite Western pressure.”¶ 24¶ Tehran is also known to¶ be active in the region’s ubiq-¶ uitous gray and black markets¶ as well as its free trade areas—¶ operating both directly and via¶ its terrorist proxy Hezbollah.¶ 25¶ Most notoriously, these in-¶ clude the so-called “Triple¶ Frontier” at the crossroads of¶ Argentina, Paraguay, and Bra-¶ zil as well as Venezuela’s¶ Margarita Island.

### Extensions – Iran Profits incentives

#### Venezuela enables spread of Iranian influence – economic contacts *ensure*.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council “Iran Courts Latin America”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3297.pdf>, DZ)

Far and away the most prominent such partnership has been with Venezuela. Since Hugo¶ Chavez became president in 1999, alignment with¶ Tehran has emerged as a cardinal tenet of¶ Caracas’s foreign policy. The subsequent elec-¶ tion of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian¶ presidency in 2005 kicked cooperation into high¶ gear with dramatic results. Today, the two coun-¶ tries enjoy an extensive and vibrant strategic¶ partnership. Venezuela has emerged as an important source of material assistance for Tehran’s¶ sprawling nuclear program as well as a vocal dip-¶ lomatic backer of its right to atomic power.¶ 3¶ The¶ Chavez regime also has become a safe haven and¶ source of financial support for Hezbollah, Iran’s¶ most powerful terrorist proxy.¶ 4¶ In turn, Tehran’s¶ feared Revolutionary Guard has become involved¶ in training Venezuela’s secret services and po-¶ lice.¶ 5¶ Economic contacts between Caracas and¶ Tehran likewise have exploded—expanding from¶ virtually nil in the early¶ 2000s to more than $20¶ billion in total trade and¶ cooperation agreements¶ today.¶ 6¶ Just as significantly,¶ Venezuela has served as¶ Iran’s gateway for further¶ economic and diplomatic¶ expansion into the re-¶ gion. Aided by its partnership with Caracas and¶ bolstered by a shared anti-American outlook,¶ Tehran has succeeded in forging significant strategic, economic, and political links with the re-¶ gime of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa¶ in Ecuador. Even Iran’s relations with Argentina,¶ where Iranian-supported terrorists carried out¶ major bombings in 1992 and 1994, have improved¶ in recent times, as the government of President¶ Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has hewed a more¶ conciliatory line toward Tehran.¶ 7

### Link – Cuba – General

#### Iran takes advantage of the plan – benefits economically, spreads its influence throughout Latin America.

Lopez ‘10

(Venessa, “Cuba’s Growing Relations with Iran and Syria”, August, An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, U. of Miami, <http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue127.htm>, DZ)

Cuba’s relations with Iran and Syria are at all-time highs. Cuba’s ties with Syria are mostly political, with Syria frequently condemning the U.S. embargo against Cuba and Cuba condemning Israeli actions. Cuba’s relations with Iran, on the other hand, have been far more lucrative for the Cuban government, as Iran has provided significant economic support for Cuba’s devastated economy.¶ ¶ Cuba and Iran¶ Of all state leaders sympathetic to the Cuban government, Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seems the most supportive next to Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Cuba's alliance with Iran "dates to 1979 when Fidel Castro became one of the first heads of state to recognize the Islamic Republic's radical clerics. Addressing then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, Castro insisted that there was 'no contradiction between revolution and religion,' …. Over the next two decades, Castro fostered a unique relationship between a secular communist Cuba and theocratic Iran united by a common hatred of the United States and the liberal democratic West." (1) The intensity of political ties between Iran and Cuba are not new; Cuba has for many years supported Iran's right to the use of nuclear energy and Iran has repeatedly condemned the U.S. embargo against Cuba. In 2008, Cuba's Foreign Minister met with Ahmadinejad in Tehran and both voiced their pleasure at the closeness of their countries’ relations. (2)¶ Ahmadinejad's anti-Americanism has been obvious since his first election as Iran's President. Under this ideological tie, Cuba and Iran developed an economic relationship that would prove to be quite lucrative for Cuba. This economic relationship began growing in 2005 with Iran's development of an investment program to assist Cuba's transportation sector. This was the basis for Iran's $295 million loan to finance imports, including the 750 railway cars that Cuba purchased in January of 2008. (3)¶ In February 2008, both countries signed an initial agreement for scientific and technical cooperation in biotechnology and medical and pharmaceutical development; later that year they officially reiterated their commitment to economic cooperation. (4) Shifting Iran's economic benevolence to a higher gear, Iran increased its credit line to Cuba to 500 million euros in November 2009, after their Fourteenth Joint Economic Commission in Havana. (5)¶ In June 2010, it was announced that Iran would open its first business office in Cuba, with TAD.CO (a state-owned agricultural company) establishing itself in Havana. (6) This company has already been selling goods to Cuba, having previously sold it 3,000 irrigations systems; the establishment of this office represents a growing Iranian presence in the island. Iran’s ambassador emphasized that this represents a deepening of relations between the countries. (7)¶ As previously mentioned, of all the countries from which Cuba receives economic aid, Iran appears to be the one least concerned with having a mutually beneficial economic relationship (aside from Venezuela). Iran, for the time being, is willing to endure economic losses to assist Cuba's financial crisis. Realistically, it is in a better position to do so than Venezuela because it needs to be even less responsive to the needs of its citizens, as the Iranian regime has a more secure grip on power than the Venezuelan. One can also note that Iran is the eighth largest oil exporter, just above Venezuela. For these reasons, Raul seeks to increase Cuba’s bond with Iran.¶ Although the relationship is economically unequal, Iran does benefit in various ways from its relationship with Cuba. As the former president and major player of the Non Aligned Movement, Cuba is able to muster significant political support for Iran throughout the international community, most notably in the United Nations General Assembly. Iran’s support of Cuba also plays an important role in its alliance with Venezuela. More broadly, the relationship can also lead to increased trade between Iran and the rest of Latin America, as well as increased influence in the region.¶ More worrisome to the United States are reports that “have uncovered covert cooperation between the two countries in the development and testing of electromagnetic weapons that have the capacity to disrupt telecommunication networks, cut power supplies and damage sophisticated computers.” (8) Furthermore, Cuba can easily provide Iran with valuable information from its sophisticated espionage apparatus. Iran is also able to obtain information on biotechnology from Cuba. In the late 1990s, Cuba began “transferring (licensing) both its medical biotechnologies and, along with the technical know-how, implicit capabilities to develop and manufacture industrial quantities of biological weapons,” creating a significant security threat for the United States and Israel. (9)

### Link – Cuba – Weak Policy toward Cuba signal

#### Inconsistent sanction policy towards Cuba signals a weak foreign policy.

Bustillo 5-9

(Mitchell, “Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo”, International Policy Digest, 2013, <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/archives/75391>, DZ)

When thinking of U.S.-Cuba relations, the trade embargo, or el bloqueo, is first and foremost on people’s minds. In 2009, President Barack Obama eased the travel ban, allowing Cuban-Americans to travel freely to Cuba, and again in 2011, allowing students and religious missionaries to travel to Cuba, as recently demonstrated by American pop culture figures, Beyoncé and her husband Jay-Z. Despite a history of hostile transgressions, the U.S. is inconsistent with its implementation of the embargo, which sends mixed signals to Havana and displays our weak foreign policy regarding Cuba.

### AT: Cuba Thumpers

#### Thumpers prove the link – no democratic reformism from travel and remittance restriction lifting.

Bustillo 5-9

(Mitchell, “Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo”, International Policy Digest, 2013, <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/archives/75391>, DZ)

Washington’s goal in its dealings with Havana is clear: facilitate the introduction and growth of democracy while increasing personal freedoms. There are many who argue that the best way to spread democracy is by lifting the embargo and travel restrictions. U.S. Rep. Michael Honda argues that an influx of politically enlightened U.S. travelers to Cuba would put Havana in a difficult place, leading to their own people calling for change. However, this is erroneous. Due to the fractured and weakened state of the embargo, over 400,000 U.S. travelers visited Cuba in 2011, making the United States the second-largest source of foreign visitors after Canada, according to NPR’s Nick Miroff. Obviously, this influx of what has been theorized to be liberty-professing tourists has not resulted in an influx of such democratic ideals into this overwhelmingly federally controlled country.

#### That triggers a negative democratic signal.

Bustillo 5-9

(Mitchell, “Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo”, International Policy Digest, 2013, <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/archives/75391>, DZ)

One example is the case of Alan Gross, an American citizen working for USAID. He was arrested in Cuba in 2009 under the allegations of Acts against the Independence and Territorial Integrity of the State while distributing computers and technological equipment to Jewish communities in Cuba. He is currently serving the fourth of his fifteen-year conviction, is in poor health, and receiving little to no aid from the U.S., according to the Gross Family website. In light of this, it is hard to believe that the U.S. would be able to protect a large number of tourists in a hostile nation, especially when they plan to ‘profess’ political freedom. This view is further promoted by the Ladies in White, a Cuban dissident group that supports the embargo. They fear ending it would only serve to strengthen the current dictatorial regime because the real blockade, they claim, is within Cuba. Allowing American travelers to visit Cuba does not help propel the cause of Cuban democracy; it hampers it.

### AT: Cuba Embargo Lift Inevitable

#### Despite momentum, embargo will stick – no political incentive.

Brinkley ‘12

(Joel, a professor of journalism at Stanford University, is a Pulitzer Prize-winning former foreign correspondent for The New York Times, “Cuba embargo isn’t working but isn’t going away”, Politco, <http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/cuba-embargo-isnt-working-but-isnt-going-away-85281.html>, DZ)

America’s embargo on Cuba began its 53rd year this fall, and it’s hard to find anyone who thinks it’s working. Even Cuban-Americans who hate the Castro brothers and fervently insist that the embargo remain in place generally agree that it has accomplished little, if anything.¶ Still, said Jaime Suchlicki, a Cuban émigré who is the director of the Cuba Transition Project at the University of Miami, “do you give away a policy that has been in place for 50 years, whether you think it’s right or wrong, good or bad, effective or not — for nothing? Without a quid pro quo from Cuba?”¶ Suchlicki came to the United States in the first wave of Cuban refugees in 1960 after the communist revolution. His hardline views mirror those of many in his generation. And for decades, it dominated the Cuba discussion in Florida, a state presidential candidates have long believed they need to win to be elected.¶ But today the Cuban-American population is more diverse, as the U.S. presidential election last month showed. Previously, Cuban-Americans regularly voted in favor of Republicans, who are generally staunch embargo supporters, by 4 to 1. This time, President Barack Obama won half their vote.¶ Now an argument can be made that if the half-century of political paralysis on this issue can be overcome, both Cuba and the United States would benefit. American tourists would most likely pour into Cuba, buying cigars, staying in beachfront hotels — spending money in the Cuban economy. And American businesses would find an eager new market for a range of products beyond the food and medicine they are already authorized to sell.¶ “We cannot afford an obsolete ideological war against Cuba,” Richard Slatta, a history professor at North Carolina State University who specializes in Latin America, wrote in an op-ed last month. “The embargo against Cuba denies North Carolina businesses and farmers access to a major, proximate market.”¶ Cuba experts say many business leaders, particularly, are making the same case, especially now that the American economy has remained in the doldrums for so long. They add that it’s an obvious second-term issue; Obama doesn’t have to worry about winning Florida again.¶ But for so many people in Washington, “Cuba doesn’t matter any more now,” said Ted Piccone, deputy director for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution and a former National Security Council official. “There’s no political incentive” to change the policy — even though the arguments for changing it are rife. Despite ample provocation, the U.S. doesn’t impose similar embargoes on other authoritarian states.

### AT: Cuba Embargo Spillover

#### No embargo proliferation – Kazakhstan, Cambodia, and Venezuela prove.

Brinkley ‘12

(Joel, a professor of journalism at Stanford University, is a Pulitzer Prize-winning former foreign correspondent for The New York Times, “Cuba embargo isn’t working but isn’t going away”, Politco, <http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/cuba-embargo-isnt-working-but-isnt-going-away-85281.html>, DZ)

But for so many people in Washington, “Cuba doesn’t matter any more now,” said Ted Piccone, deputy director for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution and a former National Security Council official. “There’s no political incentive” to change the policy — even though the arguments for changing it are rife. Despite ample provocation, the U.S. doesn’t impose similar embargoes on other authoritarian states. Late last month, for example, Kazakhstan said it planned to shut down the last of its independent and opposition media, meaning “pluralism would quite simply cease to exist in this country,” Reporters Without Borders said in a news release. But has anyone talked about imposing an embargo there?¶ In September, Cambodia, one of the world’s most repressive nations, sentenced Mam Sonando, a 71-year-old radio station owner, to 20 years in jail for criticizing the government on air. He’d been broadcasting for decades. At about the same time, newspaper journalist Hang Serei Odom was found dead in the trunk of his car, hacked to death with an ax. He had been writing about illegal logging, a long-standing problem in Cambodia.¶ Despite that and much more, Obama visited Phnom Penh last month, attending an Association of Southeast Asian Nations conference. Has anyone in Washington advocated imposing an embargo there? Suchlicki said, “Maybe we should.”¶ “Despite political tensions” with Venezuela, another authoritarian state in Latin America, the State Department says: “The United States remains Venezuela’s most important trading partner. In 2011, bilateral trade topped $55.6 billion.”¶ The State Department endlessly debates this question about foreign aid that applies to Cuba: Cutting off aid to a nation removes any ability to influence it, one side of the debate goes. But the counterargument is: Does that mean the U.S. should continue giving aid to a brutal, repressive government? It’s a quandary with no clear solution.

### Link – Mexico – UQ

#### Our link is unique – ties between Mexico and Iran increasing now and will continue if unabated.

Fars News Agency 2-4

(“Iranian, Mexican Officials Discussion Expansion of Bilateral Ties”, <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9107141682>, DZ)

The issue was raised in a meeting between head of Iran-Mexico parliamentary friendship group Hossein Amiri Khamkani and Mexican charge d'affaires in Iran Martin Torres.¶ At the meeting, Amiri Khamkani said that constructive role the two countries play in the international arenas can also help bolster bilateral relations.¶ He further said Iran-Mexico parliamentary friendship group welcomes widening bilateral cooperation in various fields.¶ Torres, for his part, welcomed deepening all-out Tehran-Mexico City cooperation, particularly in the cultural areas.¶ Early in November, Deputy Head of Iran's Cultural Heritage, Handicrafts and Tourism Organization for Tourism Affairs Manouchehr Jahanian and Mexican Secretary of Tourism Gloria Guevara Manzo held talks about the expansion of cultural and tourism ties between two states.¶ The meeting was held on the sidelines of 94th session of the executive council of the United Nations' World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) held on October 24 and 25 in the city of Campeche in Mexico.¶ During the meeting both officials expressed hope for expansion of tourism and cultural ties between two countries.¶ In July, Iranian Ambassador to Mexico Jalal Kalantari underlined Iran and Mexico's abundant potentials for cooperation, and called for utilizing the two countries' capacities to develop their bilateral relations in all fields.¶ Kalantari made the remarks in a meeting with Mexican Deputy Foreign Minister Lourdes Aranda Bezaury, adding that there are wide-scale potentials for economic, scientific and cultural cooperation between Iran and Mexico.

### Link – Venezuela – General

#### Relations reset destabilizes America’s influence.

Christy 5-13

(Patricky, Senior Policy Analyist @ Foreign Policy Institute, “Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela”, US News, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela>, DZ)

Venezuela's upcoming election to replace the late Hugo Chavez gives the country an important opportunity to break away from over a decade's worth of strongman rule—and move towards better governance, improved internal security and stability, a stronger and more vibrant economy, and a truly constructive role in regional and global affairs. It's critical that the United States do what it can to encourage Venezuela to seize that opportunity.¶ For over a decade, Chavez led ideologically-driven efforts to erode U.S. standing in Latin America and around the globe. The populist leader expanded Venezuela's ties with rogue states such as Cuba and Iran, aided and protected terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and actively undermined the rule of law in Venezuela and throughout the Americas. In the Western Hemisphere alone, Chavez used record petrol prices to prop up anti-American socialist leaders, most notably in Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua.¶ Chavez leaves behind a broken economy, a deeply divided nation and a dysfunctional government, all of which will take years—if not decades—to overcome. Venezuela is plagued with double-digit inflation, mounting budget deficits and rising levels of violence. While the OPEC nation maintains one of the world's largest geological oil reserves, crude exports—which account for roughly 45 percent of federal budget revenues—have declined by nearly half since 1999. The United States imports roughly one million barrels from Venezuela per day.¶ [See a collection of political cartoons on the economy.]¶ Chavez's protégé Nicolas Maduro, the former vice president who's now acting as Venezuela's interim president, is running to succeed the late strongman, but it's not preordained that he'll win. It remains to be seen the extent to which he can properly unite prior to the election the many competing populist factions that benefited under Chavez for so many years. What is clear is that he will drape himself in the political ideology of chavismo in the run up to April 14 elections, and use—and quite possibly abuse—government institutions and petrodollars in attempt to woo the country's voters.¶ What's perverse is how the Obama administration's move to "reset" relations with Maduro is doing more to legitimize him as the rightful heir to Venezuela's presidency than to resuscitate relations between the two governments. The move showed itself to be even more naive after Maduro accused the United States of plotting to poison Chavez shortly after the strongman's death.

### Link – Venezuela – Engagement policy

#### Engagement backfires – solidifies authoritarian rule in the country.

Christy 5-13

(Patricky, Senior Policy Analyist @ Foreign Policy Institute, “Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela”, US News, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela>, DZ)

[Check out our editorial cartoons on President Obama.]¶ Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and improved partnership with Caracas. Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever influence America has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united political opposition. The Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy towards a post-Chavez Venezuela. In particular, it should:

### Link – Venezuela – Conditions Key to embolden Iran

#### Unconditioned economic engagement emboldens Iran – US should condition the plan on eliminating ties with Iran.

Christy 5-13

(Patricky, Senior Policy Analyist @ Foreign Policy Institute, “Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela”, US News, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela>, DZ)

Condition future diplomatic and economic relations. Corruption and criminality were widespread under the Chavez regime, as high-level government and military officials benefited from close ties to corrupt businesses and international drug traffickers. Yet to date, the Obama administration has done little to hold Venezuela's leaders accountable.¶ [See Photos: The Life of Hugo Chavez]¶ Washington should make clear that full diplomatic relations with the United States will be contingent upon Venezuela ending ties to international terrorist groups and rogue regimes like Iran. If Venezuela takes meaningful steps to end these ties and ensure future elections, the United States should work with Caracas and the private sector to reform Venezuela's energy industry and identify key development projects and reforms to improve the country's economic future.¶ The United States can play an important role in shaping Venezuela's post-Chavez future. But to do so, the Obama administration will need to stand with the people of Venezuela by publicly defending democratic principles and the impartial rule of law in Latin America.

## Impacts

### Iran Influence Growing – impact uniqueness

#### Influence growing and the time is ripe for big move

Berman 6-5

(Ilan, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council, “Iran on our back porch: Column”, USAToday, 2013, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/06/05/argentina-iran-terrorism-column/2389271/>, DZ)

In fact, it could soon get even bigger. That is because the Latin American region as a whole is in a state of profound political flux. In Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, who succeeded Hugo Chavez as president this past April, is presiding over an all-out implosion of the national economy, complete with shortages on commodities such as toilet paper, sugar and flour. Next door in Colombia, the government of President Juan Manuel Santos has embarked upon a complicated and controversial peace process with the extremist FARC militia -- one that could result in the FARC gaining significantly in both political relevance and actual power. Even in Nisman's own Argentina, a new and softer attitude toward Iran has begun to take root, manifested in growing bilateral trade ties and talks of a "truth commission" to reexamine the AMIA case (and, ostensibly, to rewrite history in Tehran's favor). These developments could provide new opportunities for Iran to expand its regional influence and its strategic capabilities.

#### Iran ties to Latin America increasing – it’s an *intentional strategy* of subverting economic isolation.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council “Iran Courts Latin America”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3297.pdf>, DZ)

Outreach to Latin America is seen by the¶ Iranian regime first and foremost as a means to¶ lessen its deepening international isolation. Since¶ 2003, when its previously clandestine nuclear¶ program became a pressing international issue,¶ Tehran has sought to mitigate the mounting¶ political and economic restrictions levied against¶ it by the United States and its allies through¶ intensified diplomatic outreach abroad.¶ Due to its favorable geopolitical climate—¶ typified by vast ungoverned areas and wide-¶ spread anti-Americanism—Latin America has¶ become an important focus of this effort. Over¶ the past decade, the regime has nearly doubled¶ the number of embassies in the region (from six¶ in 2005 to ten in 2010) and has devoted consid-¶ erable energy to forging economic bonds with¶ sympathetic regional governments.¶ 2

### AT: Economic Ties Inevitable

#### Iran lacks sustainable economic engagement *for now* – trend is reversible.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council “Iran Courts Latin America”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3297.pdf>, DZ)

Understanding these motivations is essen-¶ tial to assessing the significance of Latin America¶ in Tehran’s strategic calculus and to determin-¶ ing whether its efforts there are successful.¶ For the moment, Iranian regional inroads¶ represent a work in progress. The Islamist re-¶ gime has demonstrated a clear interest in Latin¶ America over the past decade and is now striv-¶ ing to expand its influence there. As of yet, how-¶ ever, it has not succeeded in solidifying this¶ presence—or in fully operationalizing its re-¶ gional relationships and institutionalizing its in-¶ fluence. As experts have noted, despite Tehran’s¶ generous promises of economic engagement¶ with regional states, precious little of this aid¶ has actually materialized, save in the case of¶ Venezuela.¶ 31¶ Moreover, despite increasingly ro-¶ bust cooperation with regional states on min-¶ ing and extraction, there is as yet no indication¶ that Latin America by itself can serve as the¶ answer for Iran’s strategic resource needs.

### AT: Iran Influence Inevitable

#### Iran influence in Latin America is not inevitable – ability to stabilize economic arrangements is the litmus test.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council “Iran Courts Latin America”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3297.pdf>, DZ)

Furthermore, an expansion of Tehran’s foot-¶ print in the region is not necessarily inevitable.¶ Over the past year, the health of the Islamic¶ Republic’s foremost regional ally, Hugo Chavez,¶ has become increasingly critical, and the Ven-¶ ezuelan strongman is now believed to be in the¶ terminal stages of cancer. Significant ambiguity¶ abounds over Venezuela’s future direction and,¶ as a result, about the durability of the partner-¶ ship forged between Caracas and Tehran under¶ Chavez.¶ Tehran’s expanding regional activism, there-¶ fore, can be understood at least in part as contingency planning of sorts: an effort to broaden¶ contacts and ensure the continuance of its re-¶ gional influence in a post-Chavez environment.¶ In this context, the regimes of Evo Morales in¶ Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador are signifi-¶ cant with Correa in particular increasingly con-¶ sidered a potential successor to Chavez as a stan-¶ dard bearer of the new “Bolivarianism”—and an¶ inheritor of cooperation with Iran.¶ 32¶ Tehran’s¶ future progress in solidifying and expanding¶ those partnerships will serve as an important¶ barometer of the long-term survival of its¶ bonds to¶ the region as a whole.

### AT: US Strategy Checks Iran influence

#### No US strategy to check expansion – still forming.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council “Iran Courts Latin America”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3297.pdf>, DZ)

For their part, since October 2011,¶ policymakers in Wash-¶ ington have begun to pay¶ serious attention to¶ Tehran’s activities in the¶ Western Hemisphere. Yet¶ they have done little concrete to respond to it, at¶ least so far. Despite heart-¶ ening early steps (includ-¶ ing new legislation now¶ under consideration by¶ Congress),¶ 33¶ a compre-¶ hensive strategy to con-¶ test and dilute Iranian in-¶ fluence in the Americas remains absent.¶ Unless and until such a strategy does¶ emerge, Tehran’s Latin American efforts—and¶ the threats posed by them to American interests¶ and the U.S. homeland—will only continue to¶ expand.

### AT: Iran Can’t Destabilize in region

#### Iran will use paramilitary forces to destabilize regimes.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council “Iran Courts Latin America”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3297.pdf>, DZ)

The Iranians also boast¶ an increasingly robust paramilitary presence in¶ the region. The Pentagon, in its 2010 report to¶ Congress on Iran’s military power, noted that¶ the Qods Force, the Revolutionary Guard’s elite¶ paramilitary unit, is now deeply involved in the Americas, stationing “operatives in foreign em-¶ bassies, charities and religious/cultural institu-¶ tions to foster relationships with people, often¶ building on existing socioeconomic ties with the¶ well-established Shia Diaspora” and even carrying out “paramilitary operations to support extremists and destabilize unfriendly regimes.”¶ 26¶ This presence is most pronounced in Bo-¶ livia. Tehran has been intimately involved in the¶ activities of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Ameri-¶ cas (ALBA) since the formation of that Cuban and Venezuelan-led geopolitical bloc—which¶ also encompasses Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua,¶ and a number of other nations—in the early¶ 2000s. As part of that relationship, Tehran re-¶ portedly provided at least some of the seed¶ money for the establishment of the bloc’s re-¶ gional defense school situated outside Santa¶ Cruz. Iranian defense minister Ahmad Vahidi re-¶ portedly presided over the school’s inaugura-¶ tion in May 2011, and Iran—an ALBA observer¶ nation—is now said to be playing a role in train-¶ ing and indoctrination at the facility.¶ 27¶ Regional¶ officials currently estimate between fifty and¶ three hundred Iranian trainers to be present in¶ Bolivia.¶ 28¶ Notably, however, a personal visit to¶ the facility by this author in January 2012 found¶ it to be largely unattended.

### Iran Prolif Impact – 2NC

#### Iran lacks uranium ore – ensures that deft diplomacy limits nuclearization now.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council “Iran Courts Latin America”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3297.pdf>, DZ)

Since the start of the international crisis¶ over Iran’s nuclear ambitions nearly nine years¶ / 65¶ ago, it has become an accepted belief that¶ Tehran’s atomic program is now largely self-¶ sufficient and that its progress is, therefore,¶ largely inexorable. This, however, is far from¶ the truth; in fact, the Iranian regime currently¶ runs a considerable, and growing, deficit of¶ uranium ore, the critical raw material needed to¶ fuel its atomic effort.¶ According to nonproliferation experts,¶ Tehran’s indigenous uranium ore reserves are¶ known to be both “limited and mostly of poor¶ quality.”¶ 12¶ When Shah Mohammed Reza¶ Pahlavi mapped out an ambitious national¶ plan for nuclear power in the 1970s, his gov-¶ ernment was forced to procure significant¶ quantities of the mineral from South Africa.¶ Nearly four decades later, this aging stock-¶ pile has reportedly been mostly depleted.¶ 13¶ As a result, in recent years, Tehran has em-¶ barked on a widening quest to acquire ura-¶ nium ore from abroad. In 2009, for example, it¶ is known to have attempted to purchase more¶ than 1,000 tons of uranium ore from the Cen-¶ tral Asian republic of Kazakhstan at a cost of¶ nearly half-a-billion dollars.¶ 14¶ In that particu-¶ lar case, deft diplomacy on the part of Wash-¶ ington and its European allies helped stymie¶ Tehran’s efforts—at least for the time being.

#### But that’s reversible – Latin America and cooperative economic arrangements are the next target.

Berman ‘12

(Ilan Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council “Iran Courts Latin America”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3297.pdf>, DZ)

The Iranian quest, however, has not¶ abated. In February 2011, an intelligence sum-¶ mary from a member state of the International¶ Atomic Energy Agency reaffirmed the Islamic¶ regime’s continued search for new and stable¶ sources of uranium to fuel its nuclear pro-¶ gram.¶ 15¶ This effort has recently focused on two¶ principal geographic areas. The first is Africa¶ where Tehran has made concerted efforts to¶ engage a number of uranium producers such¶ as Zimbabwe, Senegal, Nigeria, and the Demo-¶ cratic People’s Republic of Congo.¶ 16¶ The sec-¶ ond is Latin America where Tehran now is ex-¶ ploring and de¶ veloping a series of significant¶ resource partnerships.¶ The best known of these partnerships is¶ with Venezuela; cooperation on strategic re-¶ sources has emerged as a defining feature of the¶ alliance between the Islamic Republic and the¶ Chavez regime. The Iranian regime is currently¶ known to be mining in the Roraima Basin, adja-¶ cent to Venezuela’s border with Guyana. Signifi-¶ cantly, that geological area is believed to be¶ analogous to Canada’s Athabasca Basin, the¶ world’s largest deposit of uranium.¶ 17¶ Bolivia, too, is fast becoming a significant¶ source of strategic resources for the Iranian re-¶ gime. With the sanction of the Morales govern-¶ ment, Tehran is now believed to be extracting¶ uranium from as many as eleven different sites¶ in Bolivia’s east, proximate to the country’s in-¶ dustrial capital of Santa Cruz.¶ 18¶ Not coinciden-¶ tally, it is rumored that the now-infamous Tehran-¶ Caracas air route operated jointly by Conviasa,¶ Venezuela’s national airline, and Iran’s state car-¶ rier, Iran Air, will be extended in the near future¶ to Santa Cruz.¶ 19¶ Additionally, a series of coop-¶ eration agreements concluded in 2010 between¶ La Paz and Tehran have made Iran a “partner” in¶ the mining and exploitation of Bolivia’s lithium,¶ a key strategic mineral with applications for¶ nuclear weapons development.¶ 20¶ Iran even appears to be eyeing Ecuador’s¶ uranium deposits. A $30 million joint mining deal¶ concluded between Tehran and Quito back in 2009¶ has positioned the Correa regime to eventually¶ become a supplier for the Islamic Republic.¶ 21¶ Regional experts note that¶ Iran’s mining and extraction efforts¶ in Latin America are still compara-¶ tively modest in nature, constrained¶ by competition from larger countries¶ such as Canada and China and by¶ Tehran’s own available resources¶ and know-how.¶ 22¶ However, the re-¶ gion is unquestionably viewed as a¶ target of opportunity in Iran’s wid-¶ ening quest for strategic re-¶ sources—both because of its favor-¶ able political operating environment¶ and because states there (especially¶ Bolivia) represent unknown quanti-¶ ties in terms of resource wealth. This¶ raises the possibility that Latin¶ America could emerge in the near future as a significant provider of strategic resources for the Iranian regime and a key source of sustenance for¶ Iran’s expanding nuclear program.

#### This results in Nuclear War.

Hanson 06

(Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Why No Nukes for Iran? National Review, 2/17/06 pg lexis)

In fact, the United States has a perfectly sound rationale for singling out Iran to halt its nuclear proliferation. At least six good reasons come to mind, not counting the more obvious objection over Iran's violation of U.N. non-proliferation protocols. It is past time that we spell them out to the world at large. First, we cannot excuse Iran by acknowledging that the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea, and Pakistan obtained nuclear weapons. In each case of acquisition, Western foreign-policy makers went into a crisis mode, as anti-liberal regimes gained stature and advantage by the ability to destroy Western cities. A tragic lapse is not corrected by yet another similar mistake, especially since one should learn from the errors of the past. The logic of "They did it, so why can't I?" would lead to a nuclearized globe in which our daily multifarious wars, from Darfur to the Middle East, would all assume the potential to go nuclear. In contrast, the fewer the nuclear players, the more likely deterrence can play some role. There is no such thing as abstract hypocrisy when it is a matter of Armageddon. Second, it is a fact that full-fledged democracies are less likely to attack one another. Although they are prone to fighting--imperial Athens and republican Venice both were in some sort of war about three out of four years during the 5th century B.C. and the 16th century respectively--consensual governments are not so ready to fight like kind. In contemporary terms that means that there is no chance whatsoever that an anti-American France and an increasingly anti-French America would, as nuclear democracies, attack each other. Russia, following the fall of Communism, and its partial evolution to democracy, poses less threat to the United States than when it was a totalitarian state. It would be regrettable should Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, or Germany go nuclear--but not the catastrophe of a nuclear Pakistan that, with impunity de facto, offers sanctuary to bin Laden and the planners of 9/11. The former governments operate under a free press, open elections, and free speech, and thus their war-making is subject to a series of checks and balances. Pakistan is a strongman's heartbeat away from an Islamic theocracy. And while India has volatile relations with its Islamic neighbor, the world is not nearly as worried about its arsenal as it is about autocratic Pakistan's. Third, there are a number of rogue regimes that belong in a special category: North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Cuba, unfree states whose leaders have sought global attention and stature through sponsoring insurrection and terrorism beyond their borders. If it is scary that Russia, China, and Pakistan are now nuclear, it is terrifying that Kim Jong Il has the bomb, or that President Ahmadinejad might. Islamic fundamentalism or North Korean Stalinism might be antithetical to scientific advancement, but it is actually conducive to nuclear politics. When such renegade regimes go nuclear they gain the added lunatic edge: "We are either crazy or have nothing to lose or both--but you aren't." In nuclear poker, the appearance of derangement is an apparent advantage. Fourth, there are all sorts of scary combinations--petrodollars, nukes, terrorism, and fanaticism. But Iran is a uniquely fivefold danger. It has enough cash to buy influence and exemption; nuclear weapons to threaten civilization; oil reserves to blackmail a petroleum hungry world; terrorists to either find sanctuary under a nuclear umbrella or to be armed with dirty bombs; and it has a leader who wishes either to take his entire country into paradise, or at least back to the eighth century amid the ashes of the Middle East. Just imagine the present controversy over the cartoons in the context of President Ahmadinejad with his finger on a half-dozen nuclear missiles pointed at Copenhagen. Fifth, any country that seeks "peaceful" nuclear power and is completely self-sufficient in energy production is de facto suspect. Iran has enough natural gas to meet its clean electrical generation needs for centuries. The only possible rationale for its multi-billion-dollar program of building nuclear reactors, and spending billions more to hide and decentralize them, is to obtain weapons, and thus to gain clout and attention in a manner that otherwise is not warranted by either Iranian conventional forces, cultural influence, or economic achievement. Sixth, the West is right to take on a certain responsibility to discourage nuclear proliferation. The technology for such weapons grew entirely out of Western science and technology. In fact, the story of nuclear proliferation is exclusively one of espionage, stealthy commerce, or American and European-trained native engineers using their foreign-acquired expertise. Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran have no ability themselves to create such weapons, in the same manner that Russia, China, and India learned or stole a craft established only from the knowledge of European-American physics and industrial engineering. Any country that cannot itself create such weapons is probably not going to ensure the necessary protocols to guard against their misuse or theft. We can argue all we want over the solution--it is either immoral to use military force or immoral not to use it; air strikes are feasible or will be an operational disaster; dissidents will rise up or have already mostly been killed or exiled; Russia and China will help solve or will instead enjoy our dilemma; Europe is now on board or is already triangulating; the U.N. will at last step in, or is more likely to damn the United States than Teheran. Yet where all parties agree is that a poker-faced United States seems hesitant to act until moments before the missiles are armed, and is certainly not behaving like the hegemon or imperialist power so caricatured by Michael Moore and an array of post-September 11 university-press books. Until there is firm evidence that Iran has the warheads ready, the administration apparently does not wish to relive the nightmare of the past three years in which striking Iran will conjure up all the old Iraqi-style hysteria about unilateralism, preemption, incomplete or cooked intelligence, imperialism, and purported hostility toward a Muslim country. In the greatest irony of all, the Left (who must understand well the nightmarish scenario of a fascist Iran with nuclear weapons) is suddenly bewildered by George Bush's apparent multilateral caution. The Senate Democrats don't know whether to attack the administration now for its nonchalance or to wait and second-guess them once the bombs begin to fall. Either way, no one should doubt that a nuclear Iran would end the entire notion of global adjudication of nuclear proliferation--as well as remain a recurrent nightmare to civilization itself.

### Terrorism Impact – 2NC

#### Iran influence guarantees terrorist attacks domestically and on US economic interests.

Stanek ‘9

(Steven, The National, “US ‘threatened’ by Iran’s relationship with Latin America”, October 29, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/us-threatened-by-irans-relationship-with-latin-america#page1>, DZ)

In a speech at the Brookings Institution last month, Robert Morgenthau, the New York district attorney, who said his office had gathered information on various forms of illegal activity involving Iran, described the relationship between Iran and Venezuela as a "cozy financial, political and military partnership". "Now is the time for policies and actions in order to ensure that the partnership produces no poisonous fruit," he said.¶ Iran's ties with other regional players that have been critical of the United States, including Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, have also raised concerns here, according to Douglas Farah, an expert on financial investigations and transparency at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. In his testimony he described Iran's dealings with those countries as "generally opaque" and built on the "personal dynamic" between Mr Ahmadinejad and Latin American leaders.¶ "These personalised relationships have largely supplanted institutionalised, formal policies guided by input from the respective congresses or ministries of foreign affairs and economic issues," he said. Experts have different estimations of the threat Iran's presence in the West poses to the United States. Norman Bailey, an expert on economic statecraft at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, said he believes Iran's westward expansion is "designed to facilitate the funding of terrorist organisations" and jeapordises US security. In prepared testimony, he cited "extensive" Iranian involvement in drug trafficking, including transshipment of cocaine through West Africa to Europe in bags marked "cement".¶ "It is becoming increasingly clear that one of the principal motivations of all this activity [by Iran] is to be able to retaliate against the United States if it is attacked," he added, noting that retaliation could include trying to block the Panama Canal. Still, others such as Mr Farnsworth of the Council of the Americas, said it is too soon to judge Iran's intentions and cautioned against overreacting. He pointed to concerns voiced this year in Washington - most prominently by the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, - about a "huge" Iranian embassy under construction in Nicaragua, which US officials interpreted as a threat. A story in The Washington Post in July revealed that the "mega-embassy" did not exist.

#### Nuclear terror is both likely and devastating – guarantees full scale nuclear retaliation.

Rhodes, 9

[Richard, affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Former visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and author of “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” which won the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award. “Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety” http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/reducing-the-nuclear-threat-the-argument-public-safety]

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005. This group of 85 experts judged that the possibility of a WMD attack against a city or other target somewhere in the world is real and increasing over time. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. There was strong, though not universal, agreement that a nuclear attack is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist organization than by a government. The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a s ub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely initiate a new round of nuclear armament and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

#### Draws in Russia and China – the threat is existential.

Ayson ’10

[Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria

University of Wellington (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld]

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation

### AT: Cuba Reformism Add-On Advantage

#### Cuba takes advantage of the plan – free enterprise won’t lead to political reform.

Cave ‘12

(Damien, “Easing Restraints on Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, NYTimes, 11/20, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, DZ)

Any easing would be a gamble. Free enterprise may not necessarily lead to the embargo’s goal of free elections, especially because Cuba has said it wants to replicate the paths of Vietnam and China, where the loosening of economic restrictions has not led to political change. Indeed, Cuban officials have become adept at using previous American efforts to soften the embargo to their advantage, taking a cut of dollars converted into pesos and marking up the prices at state-owned stores.¶ And Cuba has a long history of tossing ice on warming relations. The latest example is the jailing of Alan Gross, a State Department contractor who has spent nearly three years behind bars for distributing satellite telephone equipment to Jewish groups in Havana.

#### Cuba tightening restrictions now – Cubans agree.

Cave ‘12

(Damien, “Easing Restraints on Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, NYTimes, 11/20, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, DZ)

When asked about Cuban entrepreneurs who are seeking more American support, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the Florida Republican who is chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, proposed an even tighter embargo.¶ “The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in fact, should be strengthened, and not be altered,” she wrote in an e-mail. “Responsible nations must not buy into the facade the dictatorship is trying to create by announcing ‘reforms’ while, in reality, it’s tightening its grip on its people.”¶ Many Cubans agree that their government cares more about control than economic growth. Business owners complain that inspectors pounce when they see signs of success and demand receipts to prove that supplies were not stolen from the government, a common practice here. One restaurant owner in Havana said he received a large fine for failing to produce a receipt for plastic wrap.

#### *Political centralization* checks reform – plan props up the regime.

Bustillo 5-9

(Mitchell, “Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo”, International Policy Digest, 2013, <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/archives/75391>, DZ)

Still there is the idea that further increasing American tourism to this nearby Caribbean island will at least aid their impoverished citizens in some manner, but this is neither a straight-forward nor easy solution. From the annual throng of American visitors, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio declared at a 2011 Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing that an estimated, “$4 billion a year flow directly to the Cuban government from remittances and travel by Cuban Americans, which is perhaps the single largest source of revenue to the most repressive government in the region.”¶ These remittances are sent by Americans to help their Cuban families, not support the Cuban government. It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the Cuban citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard of living. However, no amount of money can increase the living standards there as long as their current regime stands. “After all, the authorities were already skimming 20 percent of the remittances from Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans by non-American foreign investors,” states Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Senior Fellow of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent Institute.¶ However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a nation consisting only of a wealthy and powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who possess little to no means to escape or even improve their fate. Lifting the trade embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the Cuban people, but it will increase the prosperity of the government. Ergo, the poverty and dire situation of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo.

#### Maintaining and strengthening the embargo key to political reform.

Bustillo 5-9

(Mitchell, “Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo”, International Policy Digest, 2013, <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/archives/75391>, DZ)

No doubt, it has been a fruitless 50 years since the embargo was enacted. Little has changed as far as democracy and human rights are concerned. To maintain control, Cuba has “managed to offset much of the effects over the years in large part because the Soviets subsidized the island for three decades, because the regime welcomed Canadian, Mexican and European capital after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and because Venezuela is its new patron,” according to Llosa. However, Venezuela is now undergoing a political transition of its own with the recent death of Hugo Chávez, its president for the past 14 years, and the controversial election of Nicolás Maduro.¶ Despite being Chávez’s handpicked successor, Maduro only won by a narrow margin and will likely be forced to cut spending on social programs and foreign assistance in an effort to stabilize Venezuela’s dire economic problems. Therefore, now is the ideal time to take action. Without Venezuela’s support, the Cuban government will assuredly face an economic crisis. Strengthening the embargo to limit U.S. dollars flowing into Cuba would place further pressure on the Cuban government and has the potential to trigger an economic collapse. A change in the Cuban political climate is within reach.

### AT: Chavez Death implicates the DA

#### Didn’t change basic political ideology of Venezuela – authoritarian populism up now.

De Onis 5-15

(Juan, “After Chavez, Authoritarianism Still Threatens Latin America”, World Affairs, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/juan-de-onis/after-chavez-authoritarianism-still-threatens-latin-america>, DZ)

While Venezuela remains conflicted in post-election political violence, the followers of the late President Hugo Chávez continue to apply the playbook of authoritarian populism throughout Latin America in their pursuit of more power. This political perversion is going to continue to be a threat to genuine constitutional democracy in Latin America until new electoral majorities develop around genuine republican leaders. It will not be easy because Latin America’s new middle class voters have not yet settled on what kind of societies they want in the 21st century.

#### Maduro is the new Chavez – system was shaken, but won’t fall apart.

De Onis 5-15

(Juan, “After Chavez, Authoritarianism Still Threatens Latin America”, World Affairs, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/juan-de-onis/after-chavez-authoritarianism-still-threatens-latin-america>, DZ)

The death by cancer of Chávez in February and his replacement by Nicolás Maduro, the vice president, after a hasty election, produced a narrow victory that the Venezuelan opposition contends was fraudulent. While Henrique Capriles, the opposition candidate, demanded a recount, the governing coalition set about rounding up broad support from other Latin American countries for recognition of the result. The outcome may be uncertain, but economic and political factors are working in Maduro’s favor.¶ While oil-rich Venezuela continues to have abundant petro dollars to hand out as economic benefits to favored customers, the Bolivarian political structure Chávez championed will win support. A week after taking office, Maduro chaired a meeting of Petrocaribe, an organization through which Venezuela supplies $300 million in subsidized oil to 18 nations in Central America and the Caribbean. Maduro said Venezuela would continue the handouts and called for political collaboration. This drew enthusiastic support from the presidents of the Petrocaribe countries, including countries like Honduras and Guatemala that have no political affinities with Venezuela, but are now part of Maduro’s solidarity network. Cuba is of course the great beneficiary of this largesse because Venezuela provides Cuba more than 100,000 barrels a day in oil products that keep the lights on and motor vehicles running in Havana. The Bolivarian movement for 21st-century socialism was shaken by the death of Chávez, its charismatic leader, but it is not going to fall apart as long as Venezuela has the petro dollars to buy supporters and follows the astute political advice of its Cuban partners.

#### Obama will seek an accommodation – collaboration of ALBA shields Maduro from international pressure.

De Onis 5-15

(Juan, “After Chavez, Authoritarianism Still Threatens Latin America”, World Affairs, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/juan-de-onis/after-chavez-authoritarianism-still-threatens-latin-america>, DZ)

After lining up Petrocaribe’s political support, Maduro made a strategic trip last week, visiting Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, which are Venezuela’s partners in Mercosur, also known as the Common Market of the South. From President Cristina Kirchner of Argentina and President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil he received promises of huge shipments of foods, like beef, sugar, and vegetable oil. Uruguay threw in some rice, and accepted a Venezuelan offer to provide cheap oil for its state-owned refinery. Food shortages are rampant in Venezuela, where the government is supposed to provide cheap food through social markets. The Mercosur commitments are a strong political message that the largest South American countries are going to collaborate to keep Maduro in power if Maduro can keep the opposition protesters under control without excessive violence.¶ But this is not democracy, and none of the Mercosur partners are challenging the basic political practices of authoritarian populism implanted in Venezuela. On the contrary, they are adopting methods that subvert the checks and balances of a republican division of power. In Argentina, the radical Peronists now in power under Kirchner pushed a judiciary reform through Congress last week that seeks to end any independent judiciary in the country. The main objective of this maneuver is to overcome rejection in the Supreme Court of a constitutional reform that would allow Kirchner to run for a third term, now banned. Under the judicial reform approved by the Peronist majorities, the executive could pack the courts with new appointees considered favorable to the government. Judges now appointed by a process of judicial selection would be elected by popular vote. The federal government could override court injunctions by a vote of Congress. Peronists present this proposed change as a “democratization” of the current legal system, which has been holding Kirchner in check in her dispute with privately owned newspapers, also a target of attacks in Venezuela and Ecuador.¶ Emasculation of the judicial system is one of the first steps imposed when populist regimes seek to remove obstacles to unlimited power and permanent control of elected offices. This happened in Venezuela, early in the Chávez regime, and Bolivia and Ecuador have followed the same practice. President Rafael Correa of Ecuador has already been elected to a second term, and President Evo Morales announced last week that he would be running for a third consecutive term in Bolivian elections next year if the Supreme Court validates a constitutional reform opening the way to ruling in perpetuity. Morales said he had to continue as president to keep Bolivia from falling into the hands of “yanqui imperialism” and he backed this up by expelling the United States Aid Agency (USAID) from the country. The opposition says it will fight the change as unconstitutional, but what hopes are there for an impartial decision if the judges are all political appointees?¶ Ecuador and Bolivia have joined Venezuela and Cuba in the so-called Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) and also are active in the larger Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). These are political bodies that exclude the United States and Canada from their deliberations. So, Maduro can expect to be defended by these bodies from international criticism. As long as the oil keeps flowing, no criticisms will be heard from China, which has invested at least $20 billion in Venezuelan energy and infrastructure projects, in exchange for oil. Neither will there be any discouraging words from Russia as long as Venezuela keeps paying for major arms purchases.¶ Secretary of State John Kerry said the US would withhold recognition of Maduro until there was a recount of the votes, as demanded by Capriles, but that is a feeble sign of concern that lacks broad support. The Obama administration is unlikely to choose a fight and will probably seek an accommodation if Maduro and the governing Unified Socialist Party (PSUV) contain violence against the opposition.

## Aff Answers

### Aff – AT: Cuba Link emboldens Iran

#### Sanctions are toothless now – MNCs and foreign exchange prove.

Hanson, Batten, and Ealey ‘13

(Daniel, Daye, and Harrison, Daniel Hanson is an economics researcher at the American Enterprise Institute. Dayne Batten is affiliated with the University of North Carolina Department of Public Policy. Harrison Ealey is a financial analyst. “It’s Time for The US To End Its Senseless Embargo of Cuba”, Forbes, 1/16, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba>, DZ)

At present, the U.S. is largely alone in restricting access to Cuba. The embargo has long been a point of friction between the United States and allies in Europe, South America, and Canada. Every year since 1992, the U.S. has been publically condemned in the United Nations for maintaining counterproductive and worn out trade and migration restrictions against Cuba despite the fact that nearly all 5,911 U.S. companies nationalized during the Castro takeover have dropped their claims.¶ Moreover, since Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians can travel and conduct business in Cuba unimpeded, the sanctions are rather toothless. The State Department has argued that the cost of conducting business in Cuba is only negligibly higher because of the embargo. For American multinational corporations wishing to undertake commerce in Cuba, foreign branches find it easy to conduct exchanges.

### Aff – AT: Cuba Link

#### The embargo *encourages* rogue-state relations and *tanks* US diplomatic credibility with allies.

Hanson, Batten, and Ealey ‘13

(Daniel Hanson is an economics researcher at the American Enterprise Institute. Dayne Batten is affiliated with the University of North Carolina Department of Public Policy. Harrison Ealey is a financial analyst., “It’s Time for The US To End Its Senseless Embargo of Cuba”, Forbes, 1/16, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba>, DZ)

What’s worse, U.S. sanctions encourage Cuba to collaborate with regional players that are less friendly to American interests. For instance, in 2011, the country inked a deal with Venezuela for the construction of an underwater communications link, circumventing its need to connect with US-owned networks close to its shores.¶ Repealing the embargo would fit into an American precedent of lifting trade and travel restrictions to countries who demonstrate progress towards democratic ideals. Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were all offered normal trade relations in the 1970s after preliminary reforms even though they were still in clear violation of several US resolutions condemning their human rights practices. China, a communist country and perennial human rights abuser, is the U.S.’s second largest trading partner, and in November, trade restrictions against Myanmar were lessened notwithstanding a fifty year history of genocide and human trafficking propagated by its military government.¶ Which, of course, begs the question: when will the U.S. see fit to lift the embargo? If Cuba is trending towards democracy and free markets, what litmus test must be passed for the embargo to be rolled back?¶ The cost of the embargo to the United States is high in both dollar and moral terms, but it is higher for the Cuban people, who are cut off from the supposed champion of liberty in their hemisphere because of an antiquated Cold War dispute. The progress being made in Cuba could be accelerated with the help of American charitable relief, business innovation, and tourism.¶ A perpetual embargo on a developing nation that is moving towards reform makes little sense, especially when America’s allies are openly hostile to the embargo. It keeps a broader discussion about smart reform in Cuba from gaining life, and it makes no economic sense. It is time for the embargo to go.

### Aff – AT: Weak Policy Emboldens Iran

#### Iran strategy insufficient and plan reverses trends that cause Iranian influence now.

Fite ‘12

(Brandon, “U.S. AND IRANIAN STR¶ ATEGIC¶ COMPETITION:¶ The Impact of¶ Latin America¶ ,¶ Africa¶ and¶ Peripheral¶ States”, April, CSIS, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf>, DZ)

In Latin America, Iran mobilizes historically rooted anti¶ -¶ American sentiment in combination¶ with economic incentives to draw states into its “post¶ -¶ Western” camp.¶ Economically¶ impoverished countrie¶ s¶ are drawn to Iran as a source of desperately needed investment and¶ mutual antipathy towards the US provides rhetorical packaging for¶ bilateral¶ agreements.¶ In the past decade Iran has dramatically increased its diplomatic missions to states critical of t¶ he¶ US like Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador, but also¶ to¶ non¶ -¶ aligned¶ states like A¶ r¶ gentina¶ and¶ Brazil.¶ Iran currently maintains¶ 11¶ embassies¶ and 17 cultural centers¶ in Latin America¶ .¶ In¶ addition to existing embassies in Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, in¶ recent¶ years, Iran has opened embassies in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Columbia, Chile, and¶ Uruguay¶ .¶ 2¶ The Islamic Republic’s diplomatic¶ missions¶ have resulted in lively r¶ hetoric and¶ impressive promises of cooperation, but they have not¶ yet¶ yielded strategic results that have a¶ significant effect on greater US¶ -¶ Iranian competition.

### Aff – Cuba Reformism Add-On – 2AC/1AR extensions

#### Travel and remittance changes thump the disad, but aren’t sufficient to curb hardliners *but the plan does*.

Cave ‘12

(Damien, “Easing Restraints on Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, NYTimes, 11/20, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, DZ)

Even as defenders of the embargo warn against providing the Cuban government with “economic lifelines,” some Cubans and exiles are advocating a fresh approach. The Obama administration already showed an openness to engagement with Cuba in 2009 by removing restrictions on travel and remittances for Cuban Americans. But with Fidel Castro, 86, retired and President Raúl Castro, 81, leading a bureaucracy that is divided on the pace and scope of change, many have begun urging President Obama to go further and update American policy by putting a priority on assistance for Cubans seeking more economic independence from the government.¶ “Maintaining this embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hard-liners,” said Carlos Saladrigas, a Cuban exile and co-chairman of the Cuba Study Group in Washington, which advocates engagement with Cuba. “What we should be doing is helping the reformers.”

### Aff – Cuba Reformism Add-On – 1AR

#### We don’t have to win Cuba’s economy becomes free – *limited* economic dissemination is sufficient.

Cave ‘12

(Damien, “Easing Restraints on Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, NYTimes, 11/20, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, DZ)

Owners of Cuba’s small businesses, mostly one-person operations at this point, say they know that the government would most likely find ways to profit from wider economic relations with the United States. The response to the informal imports that come from Miami in the suitcases of relatives, for instance, has been higher customs duties.¶ Still, in a country where Cubans “resolve” their way around government restrictions every day (private deals with customs agents are common), many Cubans anticipate real benefits should the United States change course. Mr. López, a meticulous mechanic who wears plastic gloves to avoid dirtying his fingers, said legalizing imports and investment would create a flood of the supplies that businesses needed, overwhelming the government’s controls while lowering prices and creating more work apart from the state.¶ Other Cubans, including political dissidents, say softening the embargo would increase the pressure for more rapid change by undermining one of the government’s main excuses for failing to provide freedom, economic opportunity or just basic supplies.

### Aff – Link Turn – economic engagement checks Iran

#### Economic engagement checks Iran – free markets key to *solidifying a US presence.*

Reuters ‘12

(Thomson/Reuters, “Boehner: Urges Deeper Engagement in Latin America”, May 8, <http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/boehner-latin-america-gop/2012/05/08/id/438420>, DZ)

The U.S. Congress' top Republican called on Tuesday for deeper economic engagement with Latin America as a bulwark against Iran's attempt to gain influence in the region and the destabilizing effects of international drug cartels.¶ "The best defense against an expansion of Iranian influence in Latin America - and against the destructive aspirations of international criminals in the region - is for the United States to double down on a policy of direct engagement," U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner said at the State Department.¶ "We must be clear that we will be there, with our friends and partners in the region, committed to fighting and winning the war for a free, stable, and prosperous hemisphere," Boehner said in a speech to the Council of Americas, which represents companies that do business in Latin America.¶ Boehner said Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's visits to Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and Ecuador this year "underscored the designs Iran has for expanding its influence in Latin America, and its eagerness to forge bonds with governments in the Western Hemisphere that have demonstrated a lesser interest in freedom and democracy."¶ Iran's attempt to gain influence was one of three "major threats" facing Latin America, Boehner said, along with the violence caused by drug trafficking and the possibility of the United States losing interest in the region.¶ "The threat of U.S. disengagement is the most serious of the three threats I have identified because if it occurs, the other two threats will multiply exponentially," he said.¶ Boehner called for a re-energized "Plan Colombia" program, referring to the billions of dollars in military aid the United States has poured into the country.¶ "Colombia still has the second largest insurgency in the world, and we need to take seriously the threat it still poses to the people of Colombia and to the region," he said.¶ Boehner received an award from the group for his work last year on winning congressional approval of free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea.¶ The pacts were negotiated during the Republican administration of President George W. Bush.¶ But President Barack Obama, a Democrat, did not submit the agreements to Congress until October 2011, after negotiating changes to make them more palatable to Democrats and securing a commitment for renewal of a worker retraining program known as trade adjustment assistance.¶ Boehner called the upcoming entry-into-force of the U.S-Colombia agreement on May 15 "an important moment for the prosperity" of the Western Hemisphere and said it was vital the Panama agreement be fully implemented in the months ahead.¶ He said it was important the United States "keep the momentum going" by negotiating new agreements to open markets to American exports. He expressed disappointment that Obama has not sought legislation known as "Trade Promotion Authority" which would help the White House do that.¶ In an apparent reference to Argentina's expropriation of Spanish oil giant Repsol's subsidiary YPF and the billions in unpaid debt obligations the country still owes foreign investors, Boehner said the United States "must also be clear about what we expect from all of our neighbors."¶ "We will insist that every nation honor the rule of law, meet its obligations, and respect international norms. That means paying debts to bondholders, honoring legal commitments and the decisions made by international arbiters, and respecting private property," he said.¶ "Some governments in the region have demonstrated an alarming willingness to drift away from such norms when it suits their objectives. When this occurs, it's harmful not only to the people of those countries, but to the potential of all of the Americas. And it cannot be excused."

### Aff – We solve the impact to the DA

#### Expanding trade relations solves the disad, and there’s no impact.

Fite ‘12

(Brandon, “U.S. AND IRANIAN STR¶ ATEGIC¶ COMPETITION:¶ The Impact of¶ Latin America¶ ,¶ Africa¶ and¶ Peripheral¶ States”, April, CSIS, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf>, DZ)

Iran pursues cooperation with states on the geographic and strategic periphery of¶ the competition¶ between the US and Iran¶ in order to create a network of diplomatic and economic¶ relationships¶ or¶ “¶ partners¶ ”¶ that¶ can lessen the blow of international sanctions and generally oppose Western¶ attempts to constrict its ambitions.¶ These p¶ eripheral¶ “¶ partners¶ ”¶ located mainly in Africa and¶ Latin America,¶ also¶ serve as alternative markets for Iranian oil,¶ provide diplomatic cover for¶ Iran’s nuclear efforts, and aid Iran’s acquisition of goods proscribed by¶ international¶ sanctions.¶ Tehran’s strategy¶ pragmatically subordinates concerns for ideological and religious homogeneity¶ to the goal of creating a coalit¶ ion of non¶ -¶ or anti¶ -¶ Western states¶ capable of influencing its¶ competition with the United States.¶ The st¶ ates¶ involved¶ are drawn to Iran by both promises of¶ economic¶ help¶ —¶ particularly in the energy sector¶ —¶ and by Iranian appeals to commonly oppose¶ the Wester¶ n international system.¶ The Islamic Republic¶ also¶ portrays its present isolation by the US and Europe as a continuation¶ of Western imperialism, and draws on its credentials as a member of the Non¶ -¶ Aligned¶ Movement to elicit support from the disparate state¶ s throughout Africa and the Americas that¶ have preexisting grievances with the Western order and its leading states.¶ According to Iranian leaders, the IRI’s competition with the US and its allies is not a just a¶ contest between states, but a clash of world¶ views. The US represents an exploitative status quo¶ ,¶ and Iran offers the promise of an alternative order geared toward promoting the sovereignty and¶ interests of developing nations. Speaking to an audience in Nigeria in 2010, Iranian President¶ Mahmoud Ahma¶ dinejad¶ called for a decisive break¶ with the present¶ W¶ estern¶ -¶ dominated system¶ :¶ We have to develop a proper cooperation among the developing nations in order to wriggle¶ ourselves from the domination of the western powers.¶ And this effort is going on among¶ the¶ independent developing nations today. We have to establish a collective effort with a view to¶ create a new international independent economic system that should be on the basis of justice.¶ 1¶ Though many of the countries Iran seeks to cooperate with are¶ militarily and economically weak,¶ Tehran¶ casts a wide net in trying to¶ build an array of partners¶ to¶ counter¶ balanc¶ e¶ what it sees as¶ Western dominance of the global order.¶ Iran seeks to be¶ the¶ hub of a non¶ -¶ Western bloc,¶ and¶ intends to frustrate American influence over Iran and throughout the developing world.¶ US ability to¶ push back against Iran’s attempts to widen its network¶ of such countries¶ is strongest¶ in¶ states¶ that benefit from US aid, trade, or that lack a significant basis for ideological¶ disagreement with US practices. While Iran’s overtures to peripheral states have the potential to¶ weaken US attempts to contain and isolate Iran, Tehran’s web is fragile and possibly illusory.¶ It remains to be seen if Tehran can ma¶ ke good on the development commitments it has made to¶ potential partners or if its bonds with peripheral states can be institutionalized beyond a personal¶ relationship between heads of state. Iran’s plan to restructure the international system in¶ oppositio¶ n to the Western¶ -¶ led model remains the vision of a few fringe governments and does¶ not appear likely to spread.

#### Plan’s expansion of economic ties and removal of sticks solves Iran expansion.

Fite ‘12

(Brandon, “U.S. AND IRANIAN STR¶ ATEGIC¶ COMPETITION:¶ The Impact of¶ Latin America¶ ,¶ Africa¶ and¶ Peripheral¶ States”, April, CSIS, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf>, DZ)

Iran’s forays into Latin America¶ , Africa,¶ and elsewhere are the product of an aggressive¶ diplomacy geared towards alleviating the pressure of Western¶ -¶ led sanctions¶ and more generally¶ combating¶ the present international order, which Tehran views as hostile to its interests.¶ At¶ present, Iran’s relationships with¶ individual¶ peripheral powers are¶ not strong enough to achieve¶ its goals, and thus¶ not¶ of critical concern to the US.¶ The¶ present¶ weakness of Iran’s¶ alliance¶ network¶ is brought about by divisions within Iran and its targeted partners, but also by sustained¶ engagement and pressure from the US. To prevent Iran from strengthening its bonds with¶ peripheral powers policymakers in Washington sho¶ uld consider the following three broad¶ strategies:¶ ¶ Engage with peripheral countries¶ , but do not¶ meddle¶ .¶ So¶ me analysts have criticized the US for ignoring the¶ periphery (especially Latin America) and thus allowing Iran to gain a foothold. As Iran’s ambitiou¶ s and¶ geographically unbounded strategy¶ in¶ seeking partners and “allies”¶ demonstrates, the US cannot afford to¶ completely ignore any region of the globe. That being said, in countries of limited strategic interest it is¶ beneficial to engage without overrea¶ ching, especially when considering that Iranian¶ commitments¶ have a¶ tendency to¶ eventually¶ collapse under their own weight (e.g. Senegal’s Seniran Auto). US aid and¶ commercial interests¶ provide strong incentives for peripheral nations to hesitate from full cooperation with the IRI.¶ Maintain US aid and support.¶ The US should maintain its current aid programs at both the civil and¶ security levels. These programs are far less costly than the expansion of Iranian influence, and serve as¶ critical ways of¶ counterbalancing Iranian efforts and showing US concern. They are key ways of separating¶ US influence from the attitudes of current leaders and building a broader base of popular support. The US¶ should also work with key Gulf allies like Saudi Arabia to mi¶ nimize Iran’s ability to use energy exports as¶ tools in strengthening relations with Latin American and African states.¶ ¶ Portray Iran as self¶ -¶ isolated and belligerent.¶ The peripheral powers with the greatest potential to affect¶ completion are aspiring regional powers like Brazil and South Africa. The US and its allies should¶ consistently stress that despite Iran’s promise of temporary economic gain, it is a political ri¶ sk due to its¶ tainted human rights record and its potential instability.¶ ¶ Make a convincing case that Iran is seeking to obtain nuclear weapons and could be a threat to the global¶ economy¶ .¶ Don’t simply keep up diplomatic pressure. Continue to work with the¶ IAEA and key allies like¶ Britain, France, and Germany to show the dangers in Iran’s actions and make the threat it poses fully¶ convincing. Explain how a crisis in the Gulf could threaten all countries¶ –¶ including the developing¶ countries outside the region¶ . Make the case through effective strategic communications and as objectively¶ as possible.¶ ¶ Seek the support of Arab allies and other developing states.¶ Make it clear that the US and its key allies are¶ not some neo¶ -¶ colonial bloc, but have strong support fro¶ m the states around Iran. Work with Saudi Arabia,¶ Jordan,¶ and the¶ other Arab Gulf states to show Latin American and¶ African countries that sanctions and¶ opposition to Iran’s nuclear problems have broad global support.¶ Make it clear that the US and its alli¶ es¶ offer¶ Iran incentives to halt, and explain sanctions continuously.¶ Show other countries that the US and the 5+1 offer Iran real incentives to halt nuclear weapons related¶ activities, and explain and justify sanctions in terms that nations in other regio¶ ns can fully understand.¶ ¶ Stress harsh penalties for supplying Iran with fissile material.¶ The US, in concert with its¶ allies,¶ should¶ continue to preemptively warn nations contemplating supplying Iran with nuclear material of the harsh¶ economic penalties they will face. The US stance on Zimbabwe¶ appears¶ to have had a positive effect and it¶ should be replicated with other potentia¶ l suppliers.¶ ¶ Avoid US actions that appear to threaten the sovereignty of¶ Latin American and African states¶ .¶ The US¶ must be acutely sensitive to the anger with which¶ Latin American and African¶ states¶ react¶ to American¶ pressure and sanctions that is not the¶ product of careful and persuasive diplomacy. It must rely on its¶ embassy teams to create a nuance¶ d¶ and careful approach that deal with each country in ways that fully take¶ into account its concerns and sensitivities. A on¶ e size fits all, or legislated¶ set¶ of general¶ “sticks’ and¶ penalties will do more harm than good.¶ The US should neither overestimate Iran’s capabilities in the¶ periphery¶ ,¶ nor treat peripheral¶ theaters of competitio¶ n as critical ones; it should monitor Iranian advances with an eye toward¶ dis¶ cerning Iran’s overarching strategy to evade Western pressure and expand its regional¶ interests. By all accounts¶ ,¶ Iran is far from achieving a global alliance¶ to counterbalance against¶ the West;¶ but Iran’s distance from that goal is in part provided¶ for¶ by the engagement and¶ vigilance of status quo powers. To secure the periphery¶ ,¶ the United States must continue to¶ engage¶ where possible,¶ and¶ closely¶ monitor Iran’s relationships with states¶ on the geographic¶ and political¶ margins¶ of the US¶ -¶ Iranian competi¶ tion¶ .

### Aff – AT: Venezuela Entry Now

#### No Venezuela jumping on board – energy interdependence checks.

Fite ‘12

(Brandon, “U.S. AND IRANIAN STR¶ ATEGIC¶ COMPETITION:¶ The Impact of¶ Latin America¶ ,¶ Africa¶ and¶ Peripheral¶ States”, April, CSIS, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf>, DZ)

As long as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez¶ —¶ or some successor with a similar ide¶ ology and¶ hostility to the US¶ —¶ continues to define his role as one of opposition to the US, Washington has ¶ little hope of bettering i¶ ts political position with Caracas or diminishing Iran’s¶ close affiliation¶ .¶ That being said, US¶ -¶ Venezuelan commercial ties are strong and provide links between both¶ countries which help maintain¶ an undercurrent of¶ stability in the relationship.¶ At present, the US¶ need not¶ be too concerned¶ about¶ this¶ Iran¶ -¶ Venezuelan relationship,¶ despite the¶ threatening¶ language used by both presidents. Mutual US¶ -¶ Venezuelan¶ energy dependence mitigates the¶ possibility of a more serious breach in relations.

### Aff – AT: Iran – US War impact

#### No war with Iran

Gilmore 2006 (David, Analyst at Foreign Exchange Analytics, Forex Research, January 18, http://www.global-view.com/research/index.html?nid=4422)

Regarding Iran, I think it is very unlikely to escalate into military conflict. Sure a stalemate on Iran's nuke program is in the cards near-term, neither Iran nor the US can afford a war, even with US troops on the ground in Iraq, neighboring Iran...indeed because they are on the ground in Iraq in a situation that appears years from a reduced US presence. Also any attempt by even Israel, much less the US, to attack Iran would drive a permanent split between the West and moderate Islamic states like Saudi Arabia and the faux democracy in the still influential Egypt. Not even a ideologically driven executive branch is eager to take this path. So I see Iran largely as a diplomatic, albeit intensely so, problem. Hence it is not the source of a spike in energy prices and a derailing of the global economy.

#### Strikes won’t go nuclear

Dan Plesch, Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies’ Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, and Martin Butcher, international consultant on security politics, September 07, “Considering a war with Iran: A discussion paper on WMD in the Middle East”, http://www.scribd.com/doc/282110/Considering-a-war-with-Iran-A-discussion-paper-on-WMD-in-the-Middle-East

The US has strategic forces prepared to launch massive strikes on Iran with hours of the order being given. Although there is clear evidence that nuclear weapons use is being given serious political consideration, actual use is unlikely given the lack of effectiveness of nuclear weapons against concealed and buried targets and the negative political consequences of such use. The aim of the new Triad and the Global Strike capability developed under the Bush administration is stated to be making nuclear weapons use less likely.

#### Iran won’t lash out

Harvard Gazette 3-23-06 (http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2006/03.23/13-iran.html)

"The second set of problems," he said, "are essentially 'bold Iran' problems," which include Iran arming terrorists with nuclear weapons, engaging in "nuclear coercion," or engaging in conventional aggression while imagining that its nuclear capabilities give it a safe umbrella. A nuclear Iran is not likely to do any of these, said Posen, because to do so would put Iran in at least two bull's-eyes - those of the United States and Israel - "and these are the gun sights of some very potent nuclear states." Therefore, he argues, a nuclear Iran is a bad thing and a problem, but a manageable problem

### Aff – AT: Iran Prolif Impact

**No Iran prolif, no impact**

**Innocent & Owen 2012**— foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, former Marine infantry officer (Malou & Jonathon, “Nuclear Iran is an exaggerated threat”, <http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/nuclear-iran-exaggerated-threat-article-1.1035003#ixzz1oZQVzjhu>)

Many of those pushing for immediate action ignore these realities, focusing on the claim that Iran is on the verge of acquiring enough fissile material to produce a nuclear weapon. But according to the U.S. intelligence community, Iranian leaders have **not actually decided to build a weapon**. As **nuclear expert** Joseph Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund has argued, Iran might decide, like Japan and other countries, to have **only the ability** to produce a nuclear weapon fast — in short, a rapid breakout option. **Even with a bomb**, Iran is not an imminent threat to America’s security. If it ever became one, the U.S. **could quickly ensure Iran’s absolute destruction**, potentially through a nuclear strike. As for the oft-cited question of Israel’s security, our staunch ally’s **second-strike capability** remains robust and can **deter Iran**. Variously over the course of the past 60 years, the U.S. government has overthrown Iran’s democratically elected government, supported its Western-oriented dictator, covertly backed militants and regional actors against it, sternly enjoined other countries to not trade with it, encircled the country with its armed forces and declared its intention to bomb it. Unless Americans are willing to fight Iranians to the death — possibly every few years — Washington must stop polarizing the situation. Aggressive policies and rhetoric do not benefit our security.

#### Negotiations solve Iran prolif

Casey 2012 (Mary, and Tom Kutsch, “Direct talks to resume over Iranian 'nuclear issues'”, <http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/07/direct_talks_to_resume_over_iranian_nuclear_issues>, )

World leaders have agreed to resume direct talks with Iran over its disputed nuclear development program for the first time in over a year. European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton responded on behalf of the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany to a letter proposing talks from Iranian negotiator Saeed Jalili. The letter included Jalili's first reference to "nuclear issues," but a French official criticized it for its ambiguity. Ashton's response came after the United States and Israel met to discuss options for quelling Iran's suspected nuclear ambitions, during which President Barack Obama urged Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid a preemptive military strike. Negotiations could serve to relax recent escalating tensions. However, there is concern that they will repeat the course of negotiations that stalled in January 2011 in Istanbul, but any progress is welcome according to a European Union official who said: "Our approach to sanctions has been proven to be the right one." At the same time, Iran has agreed to allow access for International Atomic Energy Agency investigators into the Parchin military complex, a suspected site of nuclear weapons experimentation.

**--No impact to nuclear Iran – our evidence indicts all their scenarios – arms race, terror, belligerence**

Keith L. **Shimko**, Associate Professor of Political Science at Purdue University, “International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies”, 200**9**, page number below)

The same architects of illusion who fulminated for war with Iraq say that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, three had things could happen: it could trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; it might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in the region or to engage in aggression. Each of these scenarios, however, is **improbable in the extreme**. During the early 1960s, American policymakers had similar fears that China's acquisition of nuclear weapons would trigger a proliferation stampede, but these fears did not materialize, and a nuclear Iran is no more likely to start a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course, already is a nuclear power. The other three states that might be tempted to seek nuclear weapons capability are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. But **as MIT professor** Barry **Posen points out**, each of these three states would be under strong pressure not do to so. Egypt is particularly vulnerable to outside pressure to refrain from going nuclear because its shaky economy depends on foreign—especially U.S.—economic assistance. Saudi Arabia would find it hard to purchase nuclear weapons or material on the black market, which is closely watched by the United States, and, Posen notes, it would take the Saudis years to develop the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously.¶ Notwithstanding the near-hysterical rhetoric of the Bush administration and the neoconservatives, Iran is not going to give nuclear weapons to terrorists. This is not to say that Tehran has not abetted groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in the Palestinian Authority. However, there are good reasons that states—even those that have ties to terrorists—**draw the line** at giving them nuclear weapons or other WMD. If the terrorists were to use these weapons against the United States or its allies, the weapons could be traced back to the donor state, which would be **at¶ risk of annihilation** by an American retaliatory strike. Iran's leaders have too much at stake to run this risk. Even if one believed the administration's hype about the indifference of rogue-state leaders to the fate of their populations, they care very much about the survival of their regimes, which is why **deterrence works**.¶ For the same reason, Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will not invest Tehran with options to attack or intimidate its neighbors. Just as it did during the Cold War, the U.S. can extend its own deterrence umbrella to protect its clients in the region like Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Turkey. American security guarantees will not only dissuade Iran from acting recklessly but also restrain proliferation by negating the incentives for states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to build their own nuclear weapons. Given the overwhelming U.S. advantage in both nuclear and conventional military capabilities, Iran is not going to risk **national suicide** by challenging America's security commitments in the region. In this sense dealing with the Iranian '"nuclear threat" is actually one of the easier strategic challenges the United States faces. It is a threat that can be handled by an offshore balancing strategy that relies on missile, air, and naval power well away from the volatile Persian Gulf, thus reducing the American poltico-military footprint in the region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran is hardly desirable, neither is it "intolerable," because it could be contained and deterred successfully by the United States.... [page 291-292]

### Aff – AT: Terrorism Impacts

#### Zero risk of nuclear terrorism – they are wrong about everything

**Mueller, ’10** – **professor of political science at Ohio State University** and author of Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, more qualed than your tool-authors [John, “Calming Our Nuclear Jitters”, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>]

A daunting task Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled.

#### Domestic and international opposition block retaliation.

**Bremmer 4**

(Ian, President – Eurasia Group and Senior Fellow – World Policy Institute, New Statesman, 9-13, Lexis)

This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond would begin immediately. Yet **it** i**s difficult to imagine** how the Bush administration could **focus** its response **on an external enemy.** Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and "step up" efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks three years ago. The president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a distraction from "the real war on terror". And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again Saudis? **The** Bush **administration could hardly take** military **action** against the Saudi government at a time **when** crude**-oil** prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global **supply is stretched to the limit**. While the Saudi royal family might support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually "bouncing the rubble" in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme "unacceptable". However, in the absence of an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the **domestic opposition to** such a **war and the international outcry it would provoke would make quick action** against Iran **unthinkable**. In short, a decisive response from Bush could not be external. It would have to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial than those provided by the Patriot Act, **Americans would experience stepped-up domestic surveillance** and border controls, much tighter security in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects. Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But **concern for civil liberties** and personal freedom **would ensure that the government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for** the invasion of **Afghanistan.**

#### Obama won’t retaliate to terrorist attack

**Crowley 10**

(Michael, Senior Editor – New Republic, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, The New Republic, 1-5, http://www.tnr.com/node/72263)

As the story notes, **some experts don't place much weight on** how **our** publicly-stated **doctrine** emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that **any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case.** But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. **Would we,** for instance, **actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it** in America? **That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that** a President **Obama--or any president,** for that matter--**would go through with it**.